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Domestic reformulation of the moral
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As it has developed since perestroika, Russian
capitalism has suffered from a nefarious repu-
tation at international level, particularly
during the second half of the 1990s. The decis-
ion by the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering (FATF) in 2000 to place
Russia on the ﬁrst list of ‘‘non-cooperative
countries or territories’’ represented, from this
point of view, the outcome of international
concern about the way capitalism was develop-
ing in the post-communist
context and its close links
with ‘‘organized crime’’.How-
ever, the situation improved
very rapidly from the stand-
point of the FATF, since
Russia was removed from
the blacklist in 2002 and
one year later became a full
member of this intergovern-
mental body. In 2004, when
questions were being asked
in Western societies about
the nature of the Russian
political regime, the efforts
being made to combat money
laundering and the ﬁnancing of terrorism were
frequently cited as exemplary proof of the
commitment of Russia to the values of Western
nations and of international organizations.
In analyzing the case of Russia, I wish to
show that the implementation of international
standards against money laundering does not
necessarily imply a commitment to common
values, or even to a common vision of the object-
ives of this campaign. The Russian example
highlights, on the contrary, the latitude afforded
to states to deﬁne the moral issues at stake
in efforts to combat money laundering within
their borders, in accordance with domestic
concerns. This latitude is, in my view, intrinsi-
cally linked to the ambiguities in the formulation
at international level of the moral objectives
of anti-laundering.
For this reason it may be to dissociate
analysis of the Russian case from more general
consideration of the way international concern
about the laundering of
dirty money is formulated.
This article does not, how-
ever, set out to study in
detail the activity of the
FATF during the 1990s
(Favarel-Garrigues 2003a,
p. 161–173; Godefroy &
Lascoumes 2004, pp. 151–
175) but, more speciﬁcally,
to analyze the debates
on the moral basis of its
action. Understanding the
values underlying the idea
of internationalizing the
campaign against money
laundering will enable us to grasp the funda-
mental ambiguities that characterize the
spread of international standards in this realm
and lend themselves to domestic reformula-
tion of the action pursued. Analysis of the
implementation of international recommenda-
tions in Russia will seek, ﬁnally, to show how
domestic debates on the deﬁnition of dirty
money emerge and how they modify the
objectives of the drive against money laundering
at the national level.1
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The moral foundations of the
international campaign
against money laundering
Research in the sphere of international relations
generally regards combating money laundering
as an issue of global governance, one of
sufﬁciently serious global concern to justify
international action (Williams & Baudin-
O’Hayon 2002). This concern is based on moral
considerations related to the economic and
political dangers of global capital ﬂows of illicit
origin, associated in particular with drug traf-
ﬁcking and the activities of organized crime
(Strange 1998). Dirty money threatens ﬁnancial
stability, both nationally (Fabre 1999) and
internationally (Quirk 1996), and undermines
the power of the state (Strange 1996, pp. 117–
119). Most of the research that has examined
anti-money-laundering programmes since the
end of the 1980s does not question the moral
foundations of these undertakings and seeks to
assess how far the results achieved match up
to the initial objectives. It praises the efforts to
disseminate anti-laundering standards but de-
nounces the superﬁcial commitment, not to say
duplicity, of ‘‘weak’’, ‘‘corrupt’’ and ‘‘criminal’’
states as well as the frequent reluctance of
private ﬁnancial actors to play a part in the
campaign. It also notes a tendency for the
activities of the FATF to lapse into excessive
routine, being mainly focused on the production
of a calendar of self-assessment and mutual
evaluation procedures (Williams & Baudin-
O’Hayon 2002, pp. 138–143).
Criticism of the moral foundations of the
campaign against money laundering developed
in particular in the second half of the 1990s. It
viewed the promulgation of anti-laundering
standards as a partial and selective exercise in
the management of transnational ﬂows of
capital of illicit origin, since half-hearted efforts
were simultaneously made to combat ‘‘different
kinds of illicit ﬁnancial activities [that] have
expanded dramatically alongside the ﬁnancial
globalization trend: [. . .] tax evasion, and capital
ﬂight’’ (Helleiner 1999, p. 54). The anti-
laundering campaign resembled a ‘‘global
prohibition regime’’, in the words of Ethan
Nadelmann (1990, pp. 479–526), which was less
a response to the emergence of a natural threat
linked to the context of ﬁnancial globalization
than to the political desire to promote ideas
bound up with complex interests (Helleiner
1999, p. 80). The exclusive focus on laundering
was due to three factors according to Helleiner:
the dominance of liberal ideology in the 1980s,
which recognized the rationality of the practices
of tax evasion and capital ﬂight in the face of
state interventionism; the interest of ﬁnancial
actors in preserving their reputation by denying
any indulgence towards actors unanimously
recognized as illegitimate (trafﬁckers, criminal
organizations, etc.); and, lastly, the determina-
tion of American political leaders to internatio-
nalize the war on drugs launched some years
previously (Helleiner 1999, p. 57–62; on this last
point, see Friman 1996).
This differential treatment of illicit transna-
tional ﬁnancial ﬂows drew condemnation based
on moral arguments: action against money
laundering focuses on major forms of trafﬁck-
ing, organized crime and, more recently, terror-
ism, while leaving unpunished certain forms of
economic delinquency committed by more
socially reputable players, such as business
leaders and political elites (Strange 1998, pp.
123, 133–134). This charge led to business circles
being suspected of duplicity (Godefroy &
Lascoumes 2004, pp.17–18) and was taken up
outside the academic world, as underlined in
France by the mobilization – albeit limited – of
magistrates and non-governmental organiza-
tions. For the purposes of the present argument,
this criticism highlights the existence of a conﬂict
between plural forms of moral justiﬁcation of
the campaign against money laundering. It is
important to analyze whether this divergence of
approach reﬂects or produces conﬂictual ten-
sions between the various parties responsible for
drawing up or applying international anti-
laundering standards.
A second set of criticisms concerns the
political and social effects of international
efforts in this ﬁeld. They involve rejection of
the hypothesis of a link between the spread of
international anti-laundering standards and the
erosion of state power. Contrary to what the
vision of a zero-sum game might suggest, some
authors consider that the implementation of
international standards in this ﬁeld increases the
prerogatives of the state, which is thereby better
equipped to regulate and arbitrarily repress
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certain private ﬁnancial transactions, at the
expense of individual freedoms (Naylor 2002,
pp. 133–195). On the basis of the observation
that the USA plays a predominant role in the
anti-money laundering campaign, other re-
searchers take the view that the diffusion of
international standards serves as an alibi for the
extension of US law enforcement powers outside
their territory and for the global dissemination
at a distance of a series of law-enforcement and
judicial techniques potentially prejudicial to
public freedoms (Sheptycki 2000, pp. 135–176).
This critical literature is interesting in its
rejection of the moral assumptions that tradi-
tionally legitimize, in the eyes of its promoters,
the campaign against money laundering and in
endeavour to understand the conﬂicts and
power relations that come to the fore in the
course of its development and implementation.
Efforts in this domain should, in our view, be
analyzed as the expression of a recent interna-
tional preoccupation, based on a minimum
consensus between a wide range of actors and
entailing the simultaneous promotion of norms,
institutions and professional practices designed
to extend to all parts of the world. The exercise is
all the more complex in that it necessarily
depends on twofold cooperation – between
states and between professions. International
standards are drawn up in the ﬁrst instance
under the aegis of the G7 and entail the states
concerned reaching agreement on the deﬁnition
of this international concern, despite particular
circumstances such as the existence of close links
with offshore ﬁnancial centres. To these opposi-
tions must be added conﬂicts between the
different administrations involved in anti-
laundering, such as the Ministry of Finance,
Ministry of the Interior, andMinistry of Justice.
Finally, private ﬁnancial actors, who ﬁnd
themselves having to implement the measures
adopted, are also involved in the exercise to a
greater or lesser degree. The anti-laundering
drive depends by its very nature on a novel form
of cooperation between governmental law-en-
forcement and judicial institutions and private
ﬁnancial agents, who are obliged to report any
suspicions aroused by the transactions that pass
before them (Favarel-Garrigues 2003a).
Nonetheless, critical analyses of action to
combat money laundering do not take sufﬁcient
account of the processes whereby international
standards are implemented at the national level.
Condemnation of the selective character of the
ﬁght against dirty money rarely leads to ques-
tions being asked about the margin of ﬂexibility
that states potentially have to modify the
objectives set at international level. The imple-
mentation phase thus seems linked to a formal
procedure that remains inconsequential or to an
act of submission to norms imposed from
outside. Yet there is no reason to believe in
principle that international standards represent
constraints for the states that have decided to
apply them. From the standpoint of a sociology
of norms, they can also represent resources for
the national leadership responsible for their
domestic adoption. By focusing on the margin
of autonomy afforded to the agents responsible
for applying government edicts, the sociology of
the implementation of domestic public policies is
substantially involved with this issue (Hill &
Hupe 2002, Lascoumes 1990). It is addressed by
research on the application of international
norms and on the capacity of local actors to
reformulate them (Hertel 2003, pp. 2–3;
Katzenstein 1996, pp. 5–6). The topic likewise
comes within the ambit of the very limited body
of research devoted to the implementation of
anti-money laundering efforts in countries such
as Japan (Friman 1994, pp. 253–266) and France
(Garabiol & Gravet 2001).
Factors of autonomy in the
application of international
standards
The margin of autonomy afforded to states to
reformulate the objectives of anti-laundering
stems from two basic ambiguities inherent in the
very deﬁnition of the criminalization of launder-
ing and in the mode of assessment of the action
undertaken. These uncertainties reﬂect the limits
of the consensus to which the various stake-
holders in the ﬁght against dirtymoney subscribe.
Laundering is by nature an offence that is
based on another, prior, offence. Since the G7
Arche Summit in 1989, which led to the creation
of the FATF and the ﬁrst ﬁnancial intelligence
units, such as the Tracﬁn cell in France, the drive
against money laundering has been explicitly
associated with the proceeds of drug trafﬁcking.
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The criminalization of laundering ought, then,
to be based on offences connected with drug
trafﬁcking. The FATF, however, recognizes that
this linkage is reductive since there are criminal
organizations that are not involved in drug
trafﬁcking and since drug dealers may also be
simultaneously engaged in other illicit practices
(FATF-III 1992, p. 35).2 Throughout the 1990s,
the FATF progressively reduced its emphasis on
combating the laundering of drug-money, pre-
viously the main focus of its work, relative to the
proceeds of other ‘‘serious crimes’’ (FATF-V
1994, p. 3), in particular ‘‘corruption, organized
crime and fraud’’ (FATF-VIII 1997, pp. 6–7).
For this reason, FATF recommendation n1 5 of
7 February 1990, on the criminalization of
money laundering, leaves it open to states to
extend criminalization to ‘‘any other crimes for
which there is a link to narcotics’’, to ‘‘all serious
offences’’ and to ‘‘all serious offences and/or
(. . .) all offences that generate a signiﬁcant
amount of proceeds’’ (FATF-I 1990, p. 20).
The list of predicate offences whose proceeds are
liable to be laundered can thus vary considerably
from one country to another. In addition, the
domestic ranking of targets has been further
complicated since the FATF expanded its
mandate in October 2001 to include the combat-
ing of terrorist funding in all its forms, extending
beyond laundering practices, despite the dis-
agreement of the experts on the advisability of
this linkage, moreover expressed within the
FATF before the events of September 11
(FAFT-XII 2001, pp. 16–17).
This lack of deﬁnition has not prevented the
FATF from underlining the fact that certain
forms of transnational delinquency lie outside its
remit. This is true in particular of tax fraud,
which was explicitly excluded from the scope of
its work when its mandate was renewed in 1994
(FATF-V 1994, p. 6). The FATF draws a
distinction between ‘‘serious proﬁt generating
criminal activities’’ and ﬁscal and revenue
offences together with capital ﬂight and non-
declaration of income derived therefrom
(FATF-XII 2001, Annex B, pp. 6–7). The
revision of the FATF’s 40 recommendations in
June 2003 resulted in a more detailed speciﬁca-
tion of the predicate offences relating to the
criminalisation of laundering but did not lead to
the explicit inclusion of ﬁscal offences (FATF-
XIV, Annex A, 2003, p. 13). This choice has
surprised many observers since the late 1980s,
and not only within critical academic circles.
Firstly, the laundering of capital deriving from
tax offences can seemwholly illegitimate, even to
those sensitive to the interests of the business
community. Michel Camdessus, then Director
of the IMF, contested the logic of the FATF at
one of its plenary meetings: tax fraud andmoney
laundering were, in his view, intimately linked,
since ‘‘money that has evaded taxes must be
disguised, and laundered money must be kept
hidden from the tax authorities’’ (FATF-IX
1998, p. 40). Moreover, the practice of anti-
laundering has led the FATF to modify its
position, on the pragmatic grounds that ‘‘crim-
inals can avoid suspicious transaction reporting
requirements by stating that their affairs relate
only to tax matters’’ (FATF-X 1999, p. 33). The
refusal to give criminals a ‘‘ﬁscal excuse’’ has led
the FATF to encourage banks to extend their
reporting of suspicious transactions to launder-
ing operations manifestly linked to tax man-
oeuvres masking criminal proceeds (FATF-X
1999).
The attitude of the FATF is on the whole
explained by the reluctance of ﬁnancial admin-
istrations and banks to engage in a campaign
that could be prejudicial to the tax optimization
strategies of businesses. It would, however, be
over-simplistic to see the ﬁght against money
laundering in terms of an opposition between
two clearly deﬁned camps, on the one hand the
agents of coercion intent on stamping out all
forms of criminality and on the other the
ﬁnancial stakeholders, public and private alike,
rejecting the inclusion of tax offences in defence
of the interests of the business community. On
the one hand, ﬁnancial stakeholders may con-
sider that stepping up the ﬁght against transna-
tional tax fraud could induce governments to
relax the ﬁscal pressure on companies: this idea
is put forward in a 1996 IMF report (Quirk
1996), which was the basis for the remarks byMr
Camdessus referred to above. On the other, the
representatives of law-enforcement circles may
take the view that, by attacking tax fraud, anti-
laundering could lose its identity, which is bound
up with the dismantling of ‘‘criminal organiza-
tions’’ (Garabiol & Gravet 2001). It would thus
appear that the campaign against money laun-
dering is not constituted by two opposing visions
of the morality of the drive against money
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laundering, linked to a divergence of profes-
sional ethos. The game is more complex, since it
is also based on opposing approaches to action,
which lead to instrumentalization of the stakes
underlying the drive against money laundering.
The second major source of autonomy for
states engaged in the implementation of inter-
national standards is connected with the absence
of consensus on the assessment of the results of
action against money laundering. The question
of the evaluation of international action or of
the activity of an international organization
is never self-evident, since the act of deﬁning
the objectives to be pursued has fundamental
political implications where competing visions
clash in formulating the problem to be resolved
and the appropriate solutions for doing so. In
the case of anti-laundering, the positions that
polarize conceptions of the action to be under-
taken are grounded in moral arguments. Some
consider that this policy should produce legal
outcomes. While not overlooking the special
difﬁculty of money-laundering cases, which
involve proving that suspect capital derives from
a prior offence, they take the view that the
number of cases brought to court, the number of
convictions, and the volume of assets conﬁscated
are relevant indicators of the success or failure of
the action undertaken (Garabiol & Gravet
2001). This position underpins several FATF
recommendations aimed at harmonizing na-
tional law-enforcement and judicial practices
so as to facilitate international cooperation in
this ﬁeld and at simplifying investigations by
encouraging the adoption of undercover poli-
cing techniques such as controlled delivery
(FATF-VII 1996, p. 9) or introducing the
possibility of reversing the burden of proof or
facilitating the conﬁscation of a suspect’s assets
during legal proceedings (FATF-VIII 1997,
p. 20). The other vision that developed simulta-
neously during the 1990s considers that the
judicial outcome of the action undertaken
cannot be taken as an indicator of its success
or failure. The impact of national anti-launder-
ing provisions is related above all to their
preventative character. According to this rea-
soning, as articulated for example by the IMF,
requiring the employees of banking institutions
to report transactions that seem to them suspect
dissuades clients from using their services. Anti-
laundering is thus less like a criminal justice
policy than like an effort to regulate ﬁnancial
practices by encouraging clients and banking
institutions to alter their habits.
In this respect, too, the opposition should
not be represented simplistically as a struggle
between two uniﬁed blocs, defending their vision
of the desired results of the drive against money
laundering. Some of the parties involved can opt
for behaviour consistent with a moral vision of
anti-laundering to which they do not necessarily
subscribe, in the name of their professional
interests. Members of the banking community
have very often shown their hostility to the tasks
they were called upon to carry out as part of the
ﬁght against money laundering. Once required
to contribute actively to the campaign by
submitting their suspicious transaction reports,
they have begun to ask to be kept informed of
the legal consequences of their involvement.
They are irritated to ﬁnd that they bear most of
the cost of implementing anti-laundering mea-
sures, by taking on new tasks and assuming
considerable professional risks, without beneﬁt-
ing from what they see as valuable feedback on
the judicial value of the information they
communicate (FATF-VII 1996, p. 9).
Although these fundamental debates re-
main wholly relevant, a particular conception of
action to combat money laundering gradually
came to dominate at the international level in the
course of the 1990s. It associated the anti-
laundering efforts with a policy of regulating
ﬁnancial transactions through the exclusion
from international channels of operators re-
garded as illegitimate by most of the profes-
sionals involved in this international campaign.
Reﬂecting unanimous indignation at relatively
clearly deﬁned transnational threats (drug traf-
ﬁcking, transnational organized crime, terror-
ism), this policy is aimed as much at potential
networks of undesirables as at a range of illegal
practices. The need to dismantle such criminal
organizations justiﬁes the involvement of pri-
vate-sector business and ﬁnancial agents (bank
employees, insurance companies, estate agents,
lawyers, antique dealers, etc.). The operators
targeted are not only individuals, however, but
include ﬁnancial institutions, even micro-states
suspected of complicity with criminal circles.
The imposition by the FATF of sanctions on
the island of Nauru in the Paciﬁc illustrates
the approach adopted by this body and also
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the difﬁculty of reaching an international
consensus on the deﬁnition of illegitimate off-
shore centres.
This policy, justiﬁed in these terms, is today
implemented in the main by ﬁnancial institu-
tions, which since the late 1980s have consis-
tently asserted their pre-eminent role within the
anti-laundering regime. The policy favours
preventive and persuasive responses, given the
complexity of dealing with dirty money affairs
through the courts. At national level, the
institutional anti-laundering mechanism is
usually afﬁliated to ﬁnance ministries. This
policy has, moreover, been supported since
2001 by the IMF and the World Bank, which
are involving themselves increasingly in the ﬁght
against laundering and the ﬁnancing of terror-
ism, despite their statutory inability to assume at
least initially, responsibility for the law-enforce-
ment and judicial aspects of anti-laundering
(Favarel-Garrigues 2003b, pp. 41–42). Its out-
come has been the development of private
engineering ﬁrms specialised in the provision of
services (in-house training, specialised software)
related to professional risks reduction in the
anti-money-laundering context.
This approach, based on the exclusion of
illegitimate operators, rests ultimately on a dis-
cretionary conception of anti-laundering activ-
ities. This applies not only to states but also to
ﬁnancial institutions. Indeed, in most countries,
reporting on suspicious transactions is not auto-
matic but is left to the discretion of the ﬁnancial
actors concerned. The Russian case shows that
the ambiguities inherent in international efforts
to combat money laundering open up new
debates on the morality of the action to be
undertaken, in accordance with domestic pre-
occupations, or more precisely on the identity of
the illegitimate parties that the institutional
mechanism for combating dirty money is
designed to exclude from ﬁnancial channels.






The inclusion of Russia in 2000 in the list of
‘‘non-cooperative countries or territories’’ pro-
voked strong reactions in that country. For the
Russian Government, the arbitrary nature of
this blacklisting was clear: Ukraine apart, none
of the other post-Soviet states appeared on this
list, whereas they were equally lacking in anti-
laundering mechanisms. The FATF’s decision
was interpreted as the outcome of a smear
campaign launched in the United States. Among
other political and ﬁnancial affairs, the 1999
Bank of New York (BONY) scandal was parti-
cularly worrying to American leaders. Directly
linked as it was to accusations of laundering, it
seemed to implicate the Russian President and
his entourage and involved the misappropria-
tion of IMF funds. The stir created by this affair,
however, was not unconnected with its political
exploitation in the United States. At a time when
the date of the next American presidential
election was approaching, the evocation of a
‘‘Russiagate’’ served to fuel the debate on the
Clinton Administration’s policy towards
Russia, which had for a number of years been
regarded by some as too understanding in its
approach (Webster & de Borchgrave, 1997, p. 7).
In this context, the Russian President’s vetoing
of the ﬁrst anti-laundering law submitted for his
signature at the end of 1999 seemed to conﬁrm
the idea that the Russian Government did not
wish to involve itself in this campaign, doubtless
in order to defend personal interests directly
related to funds of illicit origin.
However, this image evolved rapidly. The
Russian Government made clear its desire to be
removed from the list by ratifying the Stras-
bourg Convention on anti-laundering in April
2001, and then by adopting an anti-laundering
law in keeping with international requirements
in August of the same year. Russia was never-
theless maintained on the FATF list in view of
the lack of conclusive proof of implementation.
The reshaping of diplomatic relations between
Russia and the USA following 11 September
2001 undeniably accelerated the ongoing process
of rehabilitation. The emphasis placed on the
ﬁght against the ﬁnancing of terrorism gave
Russia the opportunity to present itself as a
reliable, legitimate and supportive interlocutor
of the USA. After ratifying the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Finan-
cing of Terrorism, Russia became a member of
the Egmont group, an intergovernmental body
made up of all the national ﬁnancial intelligence
units. Finally removed from the list in October
2002, Russia became a full member of the FATF
less than a year later.
This development shows that the implemen-
tation of international anti-laundering standards
undoubtedly constitutes a high diplomatic stake
for Russia. The only G8 State not to have
appropriate legislation in place at the end of the
1990s, Russia is intent on preserving its privileged
status as a member of this club, which enables it
to maintain close relations with the richest
countries in theworld at a timewhen its economic
and military power has been considerably de-
graded. This concern seems to outweigh Russia’s
desire to preserve its ‘‘international reputation’’,
which is how the FATF chooses to construe the
development. The use of such terminology is
moreover directly linked to the objectives of a
‘‘blacklist’’ designed to discredit a state by publi-
cly naming and shaming it. It presupposes that
implementation of the recommendations of the
FATF is synonymous with subscribing to the
indisputably legitimate objectives governing in-
ternational action in this ﬁeld. However, the
Russian example shows that the implementation
of international standards is something more
than a mere exercise in compliance.
The debates surrounding the drive against
money laundering in Russia are bound up with
more general currents of opposition to the
‘‘moralization’’ of capitalism, as it has devel-
oped in this country since perestroika. What is
‘‘dirty money’’ in the post-communist context?
The priority targets of action to combat money
laundering at the international level call forth
unanimous condemnation in a society only
recently confronted by the accessibility of illegal
substances, by an upsurge in predatory and
violent forms of delinquency and by the terrorist
attacks carried out in connection with the war in
Chechnya. But for a large part of the population,
‘‘dirty money’’ in Russia also includes the assets
of members of the business community, who
stand accused of enriching themselves by illegal
or immoralmeans on the backs of the population.
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Contrary to theirWestern counterparts, Russian
business circles, which are of recent formation,
suffer from a signiﬁcant deﬁcit of social legiti-
macy, which post-communist political leaders
can readily exploit, provided they did not play a
direct role in the implementation of the major
economic reforms at the start of the 1990s,
following the example of liberal personalities
such as EgorGaidar andAnatoly Chubais. Even
when simultaneously adopting measures favour-
able to the development of private enterprise
and the ﬁnancial sector, successive Presidents
Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, along with
Prime Ministers such as Evgueni Primakov and
Mikhail Fradkov, the former head of the
Federal Tax Police, have frequently echoed in
their speeches this hostility to the new wealthy
classes.
The case of Vladimir Putin is obviously
crucial in this context, since the period in which
his major federal political responsibilities have
been exercised (Prime Minister in 1999, then
President from 2000 onwards) coincides with the
process of proscription, rehabilitation and co-
operation that has characterized Russia’s rela-
tions with the West with respect to anti-money
laundering. The current Russian President has
been engaged since 2000 in an enterprise aimed
at monopolizing political power and restoring
the authority of the state, which has led him to
set limits to the activities of the business
community. The latter is free to develop but is
encouraged to repatriate capital invested
abroad, to pay taxes owing, to contribute to
social policies and to refrain from developing
political ambitions liable to undermine the
legitimacy of those who currently exercise
power. Control over business circles is exercised
mainly by exploiting the state of generalized
legal vulnerability that besets them in a context
of social resentment towards them. For various
reasons that cannot be expanded on here, the
acquisition of wealth in the Russian setting relies
almost automatically on recourse to illegal
practices, notably in respect of taxation. Ex-
ploitation of the legal vulnerability of entrepre-
neurs takes the form of instituting targeted and
high-proﬁle legal proceedings, which simulta-
neously constitute signals addressed to the
profession as a whole. Any business leader can
identify with the fate ofMikhail Khodorkovsky,
convicted of unlawful practices that are
extremely widespread (Favarel-Garrigues &
Rousselet 2004, pp. 98–105).
Given their social illegitimacy and the state
of legal vulnerability that characterizes their
activity, Russian business circles have attempted
since the early 1990s to promote the ideas of
amnesty, moratorium or legalization of capital
of illicit origin. According to them, recourse to
illegal practices was limited in time because it
corresponded to a phase of primitive capital
accumulation in a context of failing (tax, legal,
and accounting) institutions. Capital ﬂight and
tax evasion were to be explained in particular by
the state of legal insecurity affecting business
circles. What is needed, then, is to guarantee
impunity for past practices so as to encourage
entrepreneurs to invest more capital in the
national economy (Solongo 2001, pp. 15–17).
The debate on the way post-communist
capitalism has developed continues to shape the
Russian political scene. Denunciation of its
immorality forms part of the argumentative
repertoire of political parties such as the Com-
munist Party or of the heads of law-enforcement
and judicial administrations. The defenders of a
view more sympathetic to the modes of capital
accumulation in Russia are the entrepreneurs,
individually or collectively, and the heads of
economic and ﬁnancial administrations, who,
however, lack a powerful political organization.
Discredited within the population, the Union of
Right-Wing Forces was not successful in gaining
seats in the State Duma at the last federal
legislative elections in December 2003.
In such a context, the prospect of creating
an anti-laundering mechanism provided the
President, his entourage and his party with a
valuable resource for arbitrating in the conﬂicts
between polarized visions of the morality of the
post-communist mode of capital formation.
This political resource has a number of facets,
linked to the content of international recom-
mendations that Russia is called upon to apply:
the choice of ministry to which the ﬁnancial
intelligence unit should be afﬁliated; the deﬁni-
tion adopted for the criminalization of launder-
ing; and the mode of assessing the results of the
campaign against dirty money.
The allocation of the institutional resource
constituted by the ﬁnancial intelligence unit gave
rise to competition between three separate
administrations: the Ministry of the Interior,
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the Federal Tax Police, and the Ministry of
Finance. The Ministry of the Interior claimed
greater experience, since it had coordinated the
activity of a specialized institution, the Inter-
ministerial Centre for Countering the Legaliza-
tion (laundering) of Illicit Proceeds, established
in 1999. The purpose of this Centre, conceived as
both a ﬁnancial intelligence unit and a law-
enforcement structure, was clearly coercive. Its
staff declared war on money laundering, asso-
ciated in their view more with economic offences
than with illegal trafﬁcking. Moreover, they
reproached Western anti-laundering mechan-
isms with inefﬁciency, intrinsically linked in their
view to the institutional dissociation of the
processes of intelligence gathering and criminal
investigation. The Federal Tax Police, the
second candidate, constituted a separate admin-
istration, distinct from the Ministry of the
Interior. Its prerogatives had increased con-
stantly since its establishment in 1992. Whereas
it had initially been set up to combat tax-related
offences, this second police force represented at
the start of 2000 a service specializing in the
repression of diverse forms of economic crime
(Gregory & Brooke 2000). It could claim greater
technical and operational specialization in com-
parison with the Ministry of the Interior and a
less tarnished public image. Prior to its abolition
in 2003, the Federal Tax Police seemed particu-
larly feared in business circles: placing in
jeopardy the survival of the businesses it
investigated, it seemed to select its targets on
arbitrary grounds, possibly linked to vested
political or economic interests. In contrast to
this coercive vision of anti-money laundering, an
alternative position gradually emerged, de-
fended by the Ministry of Finance from 1999
onwards. The latter argued the case for the
ﬁnancial intelligence unit to be placed under
its responsibility, in accordance with the practice
in most Western countries. It based its claim
on condemnation of the tensions existing
between the two police forces and business
circles, and pointed out that the involvement
of law enforcement services ran the risk of
encouraging recourse to techniques of tax
evasion and capital ﬂight.
In the Russian context, the question of
deﬁning the criminalization of money launder-
ing crystallized the moral issues at stake in
implementing international recommendations in
this ﬁeld. The decision on whether or not to
integrate forms of economic delinquency com-
mon within the Russian business community
was liable to modify radically the objectives of
anti-laundering and the deﬁnition of its targets.
Here again, the two police forces adopted
positions favourable to a broad conception of
action to combat money laundering, based on
moral considerations. The Ministry of Finance
defended a more restrictive approach, enlisting
the support of business circles weakly mobilised
at the time together with that of its Western
counterparts, international ﬁnancial institutions
and the FATF. Interviewees in my research
frequently noted that the US Government made
strenuous efforts to convince political leaders in
both Russia and Ukraine to adopt a restrictive
deﬁnition of money laundering. A number of
international organizations adopted a public
stance on this question, following the example of
the FATF: ‘‘It is necessary to address the
apparently common view thatmoney laundering
is an issue primarily related to economic, ﬁscal
and revenue offences, as well as capital ﬂight and
non-declaration of income derived therefrom.
(. . .) Priority needs to be afforded to investiga-
tions and prosecutions of money-laundering
cases which arise in the context of drug trafﬁck-
ing, organized crime and other serious proﬁt-
generating criminal activities’’ (FATF-XII,
Annex B, 2001, pp. 6–7). This position was
shared within the United Nations, which rejected
the lumping together of laundering practices and
‘‘economic and ﬁnancial operations, which
could not be immediately classiﬁed as criminal’’
(Solongo 2001,p. 21), and by the IMF.
The Presidential Ofﬁce ﬁnally opted in
favour of the Ministry of Finance, assigning to
it the ﬁnancial intelligence unit and excluding tax
offences from the criminalization of laundering,
without however completely rejecting the com-
peting conception of the ﬁght against dirty
money. From a formal point of view, the anti-
laundering mechanism is therefore dedicated to
combating ‘‘criminal’’ and ‘‘terrorist’’ organiza-
tions. This has been the case more particularly
since efforts to combat the ﬁnancing of terrorism
have moved to the top of the international
agenda. This institutional mechanism, however,
represents a source of concern within Russian
business circles. According to some, it constitu-
tes a regulatory instrument that could ultimately
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be used to crack down on certain personalities
and above all to intimidate the business com-
munity by centralizing information on bank
transactions and institutions. In support of this
assertion, it is pointed out that the ﬁnancial
intelligence unit is staffed by agents from various
Russian enforcement services, who maintain
close links with their former colleagues. More-
over, this unit transmits information to the
judicial police specialised in combating econom-
ic and ﬁscal criminality, created shortly after the
disbanding of the Federal Tax Police. Finally,
the imprecision and porosity of legal terminol-
ogy provide grounds for thinking that the anti-
laundering body will continue to deal with
revenue offences insofar as these are frequently
linked to other illicit practices that can provide a
legal basis for the criminalization of money
laundering.
A number of factors support the hypothesis
that the anti-laundering mechanism constitutes
a valuable resource in the political management
of the business community. Its instrumentaliza-
tion is wholly in line with government action
based on the exploitation of the legal vulner-
ability of Russian economic and ﬁnancial elites.
During the debate on capital ﬂight, Vladimir
Putin made no bones about alluding to the
information-gathering activity of the recently
created ﬁnancial intelligence unit, even if he gave
an assurance that the state would not seek to
identify the origin of funds repatriated to
Russia.3 Similarly, the director of the anti-
laundering unit, Victor Zubkov, makes frequent
pronouncements on capital ﬂight and makes
explicit use of intimidation, as a recent incident
underlined. In May 2004, the Russian Central
Bank announced its decision to revoke the
licence of a banking institution suspected of
infringing anti-laundering legislation. Victor
Zubkov followed this up with a declaration that
his service had a list of ten banks suspected of
contributing tomoney laundering operations. In
a context where the banking sector is experien-
cing many difﬁculties, this declaration prompted
the frenzied circulation of blacklists, led certain
institutions to denounce their competitors and
aroused a great deal of anxiety among many
customers. In the face of such public panic,
Victor Zubkov withdrew his statement and
Vladimir Putin publicly called on the banking
authorities not to initiate multiple licence-
revoking procedures simultaneously and to
show greater concern for the customer.
A number of lessons can be drawn from this
affair, which calls to mind the policy adopted
towards ‘‘oligarchs’’, governors, and senior civil
servants (Favarel-Garrigues & Rousselet 2004,
pp. 99–103). It shows ﬁrst that, in a context of
widespread legal vulnerability, the imposition of
an exemplary sanction constitutes a signal direc-
ted to the banking profession as a whole. The
reactions of the latter moreover underscore the
weakness of the corporate defence of professional
interests in the Russian context. The sanction
applied to one establishment leads banking
institutions to become divided among themselves,
or even to mutually denounce one another, and
not to mobilize collectively in defence of their
professional interests. This mode of government
relies on the dominant view of business circles
among the Russian population and furthermore
confers on the President the role of benevolent
arbiter, seeking to moderate the activism of
government monitoring organizations.
The fears of business circles are closely
linked to the last of the issues posed by the
implementation of anti-money-laundering mea-
sures in Russia, which concerns ways of asses-
sing the action undertaken. It is too early to
distinguish clearly the direction in which Russia
is moving in this ﬁeld, but it is plausible to think
that results-based accountability will produce a
strong emphasis on combating dirty money,
in keeping with the modes of assessment
prevalent within Russian law-enforcement ser-
vices. Within the ﬁnancial intelligence unit, it is
thought that the amount of money recovered,
the number of cases brought to court, and the
number of convictions secured are relevant
indicators for assessing the activity of the new
structure. As for business circles, they have no
doubt as to the coercive role of the anti-
laundering mechanism, even if it has so far
resulted more in the withdrawal of licences from
banking institutions than in individual convic-
tions in the courts. This belief is based on the
resources assigned to anti-laundering institu-
tions and on the personality of those heading
them. With a staff of 250, the ﬁnancial intelli-
gence unit is headed by Victor Zubkov, a former
colleague of Vladimir Putin in the St Petersburg
City Hall, and subsequently First Deputy
Finance Minister. The new Federal Service of
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Economic and Tax Crimes, to which the
ﬁnancial intelligence unit must transmit suspect
ﬁles, has moreover been entrusted to Sergei
Verevkin-Rakhalsky, who, like the President,
spent part of his career within the security ser-
vices before becoming the ﬁrst Deputy Director
of the Federal Tax Police. In this capacity, he
was in charge of the ﬁles of the ‘‘oligarchs’’,
according to a daily newspaper close to business
circles.4 Whatever the truth of this assertion,
which itself reveals the fears being expressed
within the business community, the personality
of those in charge of the anti-laundering
mechanism and the resources assigned to them
indicate that the implementation of interna-
tional standards will not be exclusively guided
by diplomatic considerations.
As pursued at international level since the
late 1980s, the crackdown on money laundering
may be seen as being aimed at excluding
operators generally held to be illegitimate from
international ﬁnancial channels. It is based on
moral considerations linked to the threats posed
by criminal networks and transnational terrorists.
The minimum consensus on which this policy
rests leads to the worldwide dissemination of
norms, institutions and professional practices,
but also affords a large measure of autonomy to
states applying them, in terms of the deﬁnition of
the offences criminalized and the effectiveness of
the measures adopted. The Russian case under-
lines the paradoxes of a policy that focuses on
relatively ill-deﬁned targets, such as ‘‘criminal
organizations’’. According to the Presidency of
the FATF, Russia today constitutes one of the
driving forces behind the international effort to
combat laundering, being particularlywell-placed
to extend the ﬁght to the post-Soviet area and
even China. However it would appear that
Russian activism in this ﬁeld does not necessarily
imply commitment to the international objectives
of the campaign against money laundering. The
adoption of international recommendations is
combined with reformulation of these objectives,
in accordance with domestic political preoccupa-
tions linked to tax evasion and capital ﬂight.
Redeﬁnition of the moral issues at stake in the
drive againstmoney laundering canmean that the
objectives governing their implementation are far
removed from international recommendations. A
comparative analysis of the implementation of
international anti-laundering standards would
make it possible to base generalizations on this
conclusion or, on the contrary, to identify those
factors speciﬁcally linked to the diplomatic
manoeuvring ofRussia in the international arena.
Translated from French
Notes
1. This article is based on several
series of interviews with actors in
the anti-laundering ﬁght in Russia




2. Reference to the Annual
Reports of the FATF is
made, in accordance with
customary practice, by
means of Roman ﬁgures




3. Kommersant, 20 June 2002.
4. Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 26
March 2003.
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